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Abstract 
In this study, we address the question of how the degree of business model innovation affects 
the survival of new firms. We present a newly constructed data set of 129 new firms that 
launched electronic trading platforms in the US bond market between 1995 and 2004 
following the advent of Internet technology. We analyze the founding and survival of these 
new firms during the period of our study. We find that new firms with a high or low degree of 
business model innovation are more likely to survive for longer than new firms with a 
moderate degree of business model innovation. We show that partnering with third-party 
firms with complementary assets reduces the survival of new firms as the degree of business 
model innovation increases. We discuss the implications of our findings for managers, 
policy-makers and researchers. 
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1. Introduction 
Business model innovation is increasingly becoming a priority for managers in terms of 
creating competitive advantage and achieving superior performance (see Baden-Fuller and 
Morgan, 2010; Calia, Guerrini and Moura, 2007; Esslinger, 2011). Studies have shown that 
firms that have grown their operating margins faster than their competitors have placed twice 
as much emphasis on business model innovation than have underperformers (IBM Global 
CEO Study, 2008). Business model innovation is particularly important for new firms 
because it influences their competitive position and, hence, chances of survival (George and 
Bock, 2011). However, there is a lack of empirical evidence regarding the relationship 
between business model innovation and the survival of new firms. To address this empirical 
lacuna, in this paper we examine the relationship between the degree of business model 
innovation and third-party alliance on the survival of new firms in the US bond markets.  
Scholars have emphasized the importance of studying the survival of new firms, as it can 
influence the incentives for firms to invest in costly and risky attempts to pioneer new 
markets (Min, Kalwani and Robinson, 2006). Significant work has been undertaken on how 
incremental and radical innovation affects the survival of new firms; some studies have 
argued that radical innovation increases the chances of survival of new firms, while others 
have argued the reverse (see Buddelmeyer, Jensen and Webster, 2010; Sinha and Noble, 
2008). However, extant literature has studied the degree of product and process innovation 
and its impact on the survival of firms, but not business model innovation. Recently, scholars 
have emphasized the importance of business models for firm performance (Calia, Guerrini 
and Moura, 2007; Markides, 2006; Patzelt et al., 2008; Zott and Amit, 2008). However, little 
is known about how business model innovation affects the survival of new firms.  
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The business model is a structural template that describes the system of interdependent 
activities transcending the focal firm and spanning its boundaries in order to create and 
capture value (Zott and Amit, 2001). In this sense, the business model is the realized strategy 
of the firm and is a combination of complementary resources that support the 
commercialization of core products (Vidal and Mitchell, 2013). It follows that business 
model innovation involves a more systemic change than product or process innovation 
because it involves changes to the customer value proposition, value creation and value 
capture (Markides, 2006; Velu and Stiles, 2013). Hence, the degree of business model 
innovation could have a different effect on firm survival compared to product or process 
innovation. Moreover, the degree of business model innovation needs to be studied by 
transcending the firm boundary and examining how partner firms with complementary assets 
might influence firm survival. Although there is an extensive body of literature on profiting 
from product and process innovation using complementary assets, the role of business model 
innovation is relatively unexplored (Teece, 2006).  
In order to examine these issues we use contingency theory and profiting from innovation 
theory to develop hypotheses and to test them empirically. Contingency theory seeks to 
understand the relationship between certain firm factors and performance (Zott and Amit, 
2008). We explore an organizational structural form, the degree of business model innovation 
as a contingency factor in determining the survival of firms, a crucial form of performance. 
We then use profiting from innovation theory to develop our understanding of how the degree 
of business model innovation and partnering with third-party firms with complementary 
assets jointly impact the survival of firms. 
In order to investigate how initial business model innovation affects new firm survival we 
collected detailed data on every new firm that launched an electronic trading platform in the 
US bond markets between 1995 and 2004 following the advent of Internet technology. The 
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literature on business models is still at a nascent stage and the business model innovation 
construct is not well operationalized in empirical studies (see Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 
2010; George and Bock, 2011). However, to make progress in terms of enhancing our 
understanding thereof, we must – at least at this initial stage in the evolution of research on 
the phenomenon – focus on its core elements, even if this means sacrificing some of the 
richness of the phenomenon (Dasgupta, 2002; Debreu, 1991). In this research, in order to 
operationalize the degree of business model innovation, we developed a survey to measure 
the construct at a level that is both abstract and parsimonious enough to permit testable 
predictions, and yet complex enough to retain the core elements of the phenomenon. In 
particular, we measured the degree of business model innovation using expert bankers and 
also collected other detailed data on the platforms to control for factors that might influence 
survival. To the best of our knowledge this is the first data set of its kind to address the 
important question of business model innovation and firm survival. We analyze the founding 
and survival of 129 new firms during the period studied.  
The study attempts to make a contribution to the innovation literature by examining the 
contingent effects of the degree of business model innovation on firm survival and how third-
party alliance for complementary assets moderates such a relationship. Our first finding is 
that new firms with a high or low degree of business model innovation are more likely to 
survive longer than new firms with a moderate degree of business model innovation. Second, 
we show that partnering with third-party firms with complementary assets reduces the 
survival of new firms as the degree of business model innovation increases. 
2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses 
Product innovation implies different customer benefits relative to previous products in the 
industry (Chandy and Tellis, 1998; Markides, 2006). On the other hand, process innovation 
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involves improvement to the production or distribution processes, which reduces the average 
costs and increases profit margins (Cohen and Klepper, 1996). Business model innovation 
involves the discovery and adoption of fundamentally different modes of value proposition, 
value capture and/or value creation to an existing business (Markides, 2006; Teece, 2010). It 
follows that business model innovations involve systemic changes to the value proposition, 
value creation and value capture. Despite the importance of business model innovation and 
the considerable popular interest in such innovation, systematic research on the subject 
remains sparse. Although much of the literature focuses on the definition of business model 
innovation, scholars and practitioners increasingly agree on its importance in business 
strategy (Johnson, Christensen and Kagermann, 2008; Zott, Amit and Massa, 2011). In order 
to understand better business model innovation, we need to understand the nature of the 
innovation. 
Scholars have emphasized the importance of classifying the nature of innovation 
appropriately in order to understand its implications (see Linton 2009). Innovations have 
often been described as either incremental or radical in order to distinguish between refining 
and improving an existing design and introducing a new concept that departs significantly 
from past design (see Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Henderson and Clark 1990). Incremental 
innovation is the introduction of relatively marginal or minor changes to an existing product 
or process that exploits the potential of an existing design (see Friedman, Roberts and Linton, 
2008). Therefore, incremental innovation can be seen as something that is relatively easy for 
an established firm to implement and which reinforces its dominance, as it requires few 
modifications to the firm’s current routines and processes. On the other hand, radical 
innovation is based on significant departures from existing design and potentially opens up 
new applications and markets (see Friedman, Roberts and Linton, 2008). Therefore, radical 
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innovation requires significant changes to the organizational routines and processes of 
established firms.  
The impact of the degree of innovation on the survival of firms has been varied. On the 
one hand, studies have shown that radical innovation reduces the chances of firm survival as 
a result of the increased level of uncertainty (see Buddelmeyer, Jensen and Webster, 2010; 
Christensen, 1997; Utterback, 1994). On the other hand, studies have shown that firms that 
adopt radical innovation are more likely to survive because of higher returns from adoption as 
a result of gaining a larger market share (see Langerak et al., 2009; Sinha and Noble, 2008; 
Srinivasan, Lilian and Rangaswamy, 2004). However, extant studies have examined the 
impact of the degree of product and process innovation, not business model, on firm 
performance. However, business model innovation involves a more systemic change than 
product or process innovation. Hence, radical business model innovations can be disruptive 
when they change the bases of competition by altering the performance metrics by which 
firms compete (Daneels, 2004). 
Several recent studies have found that competitive pressures have pushed business 
model innovation to the top of the priority lists of CEOs in order to improve performance 
(IBM Global CEO Study, 2008; GE Global Innovation Barometer, 2013). Scholars have 
highlighted business model innovation as a vehicle for corporate transformation and renewal 
(Zott, Amit and Massa, 2011). Demil and Lecocq (2010) explain the use of the business 
model concept as a tool to address change and innovation through a process of 
experimentation, refinement and reinvention; Sosna et al. (2010) discuss how trial and error 
learning can act as a basis for business model innovation; and Johnson et al. (2008) articulate 
cogently that successful business model transformation follows on from a new understanding 
and redefinition of the customer value proposition. Studies have also highlighted the need for 
strategic leadership to overcome barriers caused by the cognitive limitations of senior 
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management and asset reconfiguration in order to effect business model innovation for 
performance improvement (Aspara, Lamberg, Laukia and Tikkaen 2013; Doz and Kosonen, 
2010). Bock et al. (2012) add to this line of enquiry by showing the effect of culture and 
structure on strategic flexibility during business model innovation. In addition, recent studies 
have highlighted the importance of service based customer value proposition for business 
model innovation in the context of technology shifts (Tongur and Engwall 2014)), the role of 
technology transfer organizations (Landry, Amara, Cloutier and Halilem 2013) and 
embedding cost-effective designs in order to form a commercially viable business concept 
(Chen, Weng and Yang 2014).  
 The characteristics of new firms have been shown to affect performance, depending 
on the type of business model pursued by the firm (Patzelt et al., 2008). For example, in the 
pharmaceuticals industry, the founding members’ experience positively influences the 
performance of platform firms that focus on the commercialization of research services or 
enabling technologies, while it negatively influences therapeutics firms that focus on 
biotherapeutic products (drugs). This is because the therapeutics business model requires the 
continuous renewal of knowledge compared to platform firms that are able to leverage 
existing knowledge in different ways. Therefore, in the case of therapeutic firms the founding 
members’ experience and knowledge could prove detrimental to the performance of the 
firms. Zott and Amit (2008) measured the business model construct by studying 190 
entrepreneurial firms listed on the US and European stock exchanges. The authors argue that 
business model is related to strategy but is a higher order construct that measures realized 
strategy. The authors focus on novelty (devising new ways of conducting economic 
exchange) and efficiency (devising new ways to attain transaction efficiency) as design 
themes for the business model because they are the corresponding themes to product 
differentiation and cost leadership on the product market strategy level. The study found that 
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firms adopting a novelty-centered business model design outperformed firms that had an 
efficiency-centered design when it was coupled with a differentiation strategy. The study also 
showed that focusing on one type of business model design (as opposed to multiple business 
model designs) enhances performance. For example, firms adopting high-efficiency-centered 
business models were more effective when coupled with lower, novelty-centered business 
models. However, the extant literature has not examined the impact of the degree of business 
model innovation on survival. 
The body of profiting from innovation literature has argued that in order to 
appropriate value from innovation, firms need to possess complementary assets to their core 
proposition (Teece, 1986, 2010). Although there is an extensive body of literature on 
profiting from product and process innovation using complementary assets, the role of 
business model innovation is relatively unexplored (Teece, 2006). Exceptions are studies by 
Desyllas and Sako (2013) and Denicolai, Ramirez and Tidd (2014). Desyllas and Sako (2013) 
show how intellectual property protection can act as a means of protection for firms to build 
specialized complementary assets in order to transform the business model. Denicolai, 
Ramirez and Tidd (2014) show how the novel combinations of external and internal 
knowledge contribute to sales growth. However, the extant literature does not show how 
partnering to access complementary assets affects the relationship between the degree of 
business model innovation and survival.  
2.1 Degree of Business Model Innovation and Survival 
As discussed earlier, the extant literature shows that both radical and incremental product and 
process innovations could be beneficial but also detrimental to the survival of new firms. We 
use contingency theory to develop hypotheses on the degree of business model innovation 
and how it affects performance in terms of firm survival (Min, Kalwani and Robinson, 2006; 
10 
 
Zott and Amit, 2008). We argue that strategy influences structure via the degree of business 
model innovation and, hence, is a contingent factor affecting firm performance through 
survival. In doing so, we argue that the mechanism by which the degree of business model 
innovation affects firm performance is different from that which affects it as a result of 
product and process innovation respectively.  
Business model innovation is different from product or process innovations as it involves 
systemic change across the value proposition, value creation and value capture approaches. 
The business model represents the go-to-market approach of the firm and, hence, the realized 
strategy (Zott and Amit, 2008). This is different to product innovation, which represents 
bringing a new product to market, or process innovation, which entails the improved 
efficiency of particular processes. Committing to a radical change in the business model 
enables the firm to change the game drastically by creating new markets (Velu and Stiles, 
2013). Creating new markets entails new institutions supporting the market and therefore 
requires complementary resources. The creation of such new markets through radical 
business model innovation implies avoiding the need to compete in an overcrowded existing 
market and, hence, to drain the firm’s resources. Therefore, we argue that radical business 
model innovation could increase the firm’s survival.  
On the other hand, business model innovation involves systemic change and, hence, 
significant risk. Therefore, incremental business model innovation might imply the 
opportunity to differentiate the value proposition marginally while reducing exposure to 
significant external market and technological risks and also reducing internal coordination 
risks from managing the systemic change. Such an incremental business model innovation 
enables the market to adjust gradually to the new proposition. We expect less resistance to 
change from the market and more willing adopters, both of which increase the firm’s 
survival. Moreover, the firm reduces the cost of coordination as a result of designing a new 
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interdependent system to effect the incremental business model innovation (Bock et al., 
2012). Therefore, in the case of business model innovation we argue that either incremental 
or radical levels of initial innovation would be best in terms of ensuring the long-term 
survival of the firm. This is because an incremental or radical business model innovation 
avoids the pitfalls of intermediate levels of business model innovation whereby the 
proposition is not sufficiently differentiated from an existing customer value proposition. 
Furthermore, it does not allow reduction from exposure to significant market or technological 
risks. As discussed earlier, the business model adopted as a result of business model 
innovation is the realized strategy of the firm in order to create superior performance. 
Therefore, a moderate degree of business model innovation has similarities to the ‘stuck-in-
the-middle’ hypothesis of Porter regarding corporate strategy, thus resulting in a poorer 
performance in terms of survival times. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between a firm’s survival time and the degree of business 
model innovation is curvilinear (U-shaped), with maximum failure of firms occurring when 
an intermediate degree of business model innovation is exhibited.  
2.2 Moderating Effects of Third-Party Partners with Complementary Assets 
The business model is a structural template describing a system of interdependent activities 
that transcends the focal firm and spans its boundaries in order to create and capture value 
(Zott and Amit, 2001). In this sense, the business model depicts how a firm chooses to 
connect the factor and product markets. Therefore, business model innovation is an outward-
facing, highly creative, exploratory process (Johnson et al., 2008).  
Business model innovation implies new ways of connecting factor and product markets, 
which require new knowledge, skills and capabilities as complementary resources. Partnering 
with third-party firms provides the means to access these complementary resources in order 
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to profit from business model innovation (Teece, 2010; Desyllas and Sako, 2013). The 
complementary assets are typically not available in competitive supply and are subject to 
unilateral or bilateral dependence (Desyllas and Sako, 2013). During business model 
innovation, one would expect that reliance on a partner with different skills and operating in 
complementary markets would help the focal firm to access new knowledge skills and 
capabilities, thus leading to superior performance and helping the firm to survive longer. 
However, as the degree of business model innovation increases, relying on partners for 
appropriability via complementary assets increases the firm’s exposure to coordination costs 
and asset specificity (Bock et al., 2012). Such increases in coordination problems might 
inhibit the synergies from complementary assets and prevent the benefits of collaboration 
from being realized (De Luca and Athuahene-Gima, 2007). We expect third-party alliances, 
which leverage the benefits of complementary assets, to work better when the business model 
innovation is incremental rather than radical. Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between a new firm’s degree of business model innovation 
and survival is negatively moderated by partnering with third-party firms with 
complementary assets.  
In order to test the above hypotheses, we collected data on new firm formation and 
survival in the US bond market and estimated various models, which we describe in the next 
section. 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 Empirical setting 
To test the relationship between business model innovation and new firm survival we study 
the US bond trading markets between 1995 and 2004. The US bond market is a large 
securities market with USD 2,650 billion and outstanding as at 2004. In these markets, 
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government agencies and corporations issue securities directly in the capital markets, known 
as the primary market, to raise funds. These securities are normally purchased by institutional 
investors such as asset-management firms, pension funds and insurance companies. Investors 
change their portfolio of securities by buying and selling these securities in the secondary 
market. The bond market is suitable for testing the hypotheses because the advent of the 
Internet enabled innovation to the existing business model. The bond market displayed the 
following characteristics between 1995 and 2004: 
 An industry in which a traditional business model exists with the potential to 
be transformed into a new business model with varying degrees of innovation. 
 New firms (e-trading platforms) were launched with different degrees of 
business model innovation. 
 Some firms formed third-party alliances to access complementary assets. 
 Some of these firms survived while others closed down/exited.  
The trading of bonds has traditionally been carried out via dealer banks. Dealers act as 
intermediaries in matching buyers with sellers and are therefore able to price these 
instruments. The process of intermediation by dealers was performed almost exclusively via a 
telephone-based system until the mid-1990s. The advent of the Internet enabled the 
proliferation of new business models in the bond markets. These business models vary from 
incremental innovation – whereby the dealers continue to act as intermediaries on the 
electronic platform – to more radical innovation, which enables direct trading between 
investors on the electronic platform. The differences between the customer value proposition, 
value creation and value capture, for the incremental and radical business model innovations 
respectively, are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1 about here. 
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The data for this study was collected from various sources. The Bond Market Association 
(BMA) publishes annual reports with information on various aspects of the bond trading 
platforms. These BMA reports between 1995 and 2004 provided data on competition, breadth 
of products, time of launch, geographic coverage, third-party alliances, ownership and 
description of each platform. The data was supplemented by press releases associated with 
the launch of each platform, which provided a rich source of data on different attributes of 
these trading platforms (e.g., type of customer and date of launch). Given the difficulties of 
obtaining an objective measure for innovation we deemed the use of perceptual measures via 
expert raters to be an appropriate method (Dess and Robinson, 1984). We describe below the 
method adopted to obtain the survey measure and other variables of interest. 
3.2 Method 
Dependent variable: The dependent variable is the survival of the new ventures. We examine 
the exits of the new firms between 1995 and 2010. The electronic trading platform in the 
bond markets developed following the use of Internet technology as a medium enabling 
electronic transactions from 1995. The start dates of the new firms were recorded in months 
from the start date of July 1994 to the actual launch date. The data is right censored at 2010 
since we have not observed all potential exits as at that date. The data set consists of 129 new 
venture firms. We observed 81 exits with the remaining data (48 firms) being right censored. 
We provide a summary of the variables and data source in Table 2. 
Table 2 about here. 
Explanatory variable: We have two main explanatory variables, namely the degree of 
business model innovation and also third-party alliance partners. We describe below the 
operationalization of our explanatory and control variables. 
Degree of business model innovation: The first explanatory variable of interest is the degree 
of business model innovation. The literature on business models is still at a nascent stage but 
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there is increasing interest among scholars in understanding the importance of business model 
innovation and its relationship to performance (Fiet and Patel, 2008; George and Bock, 2011; 
Zott, Amit and Massa, 2011). The construct of business model innovation is still not well 
operationalized in empirical studies. In this paper, we propose to measure the degree of 
business model innovation.  
Since the degree of business model innovation is not observable, we developed a 
survey to measure the construct. We measured the degree of business model innovation via a 
survey administered to a set of expert raters from the bond markets. We framed a survey with 
short descriptions of the 129 electronic bond-trading platforms. We provided information in 
terms of the key components of the business model, such as the value proposition, means for 
value creation and the approach to value capture. In particular, the description provided 
details such as the customer value proposition, the target customers, the instruments to be 
traded, the revenue architecture and the operational method of trading. An example of the 
business model descriptions is provided in Table 3. We sent this survey to six raters, who 
were experts in the bond trading market. These expert raters were very experienced across a 
range of sectors in the bond markets, with an average of over fifteen years of experience. 
They were asked to provide their level of agreement with the statement, ‘This business 
approach is a business model innovation’ (1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree). To 
help the expert raters decide on this statement, a short description and an example of a 
business model innovation were provided as part of the survey.  
Table 3 about here. 
In order to account for differences in rating based on familiarity with the platform, we 
gathered information from the same raters about their degree of familiarity with the business 
model of each platform. In particular, these experts were asked to provide their level of 
agreement with the statement, ‘I am very familiar with this business/firm’ (1 = strongly 
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disagree and 5 = strongly agree). We used this information to develop a weighted average 
rating of the degree of business model innovation for each platform. Hence, if an expert-rater 
were very familiar with the platform, his/her score on degree of business model innovation 
would be given a relatively higher weight than the corresponding innovation rating given by 
an expert who was less familiar with the platform. The innovation rating thus obtained was 
rounded up to the nearest integer. Therefore, we have an explanatory variable, which takes 
integer values of between 1 and 5, and provides a measure for the degree of business model 
innovation. Moreover, in order to test whether there was any bias due to familiarity of the 
more recent trading platforms, we correlated the familiarity reported by each respondent with 
the time of launch of the platforms. We did not find any statistically significant correlations, 
which imply that we can be reasonably confident that there was no bias due to familiarity of 
the more recent trading platforms. 
As noted earlier, the expert raters provided scores that rated a platform to be more 
innovative when there were systemic changes across the customer value proposition, value 
creation and value capture. For example, BondBook, which allowed direct trading among 
investors, was rated higher in terms of degree of business model innovation when compared 
to MarketAxess, which marginally altered the existing trading practice on the telephone and 
migrated it to an electronic interface, whereby investors still traded via a dealer bank. Based 
on the expert ratings, BondBook could be considered a radical business model innovation 
compared to the more incremental nature of business model innovation of MarketAxess. This 
difference is illustrated in Table 1. 
In order to test the validity of this variable we checked its compatibility with an 
independently collected measure of innovation by The Banker magazine (Piggot, 2001). The 
Banker provided an independent rating of a sub-sample of platforms with respect to the 
‘design’ aspect of the platforms. The ‘design’ aspect of the platform is a good proxy for 
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business model innovation, as the survey in The Banker aims to examine the level of 
difference of the business approach of the new platforms, including various aspects of the 
customer value proposition. The rating was carried out via a survey of 40 institutions on 
individual electronic trading platforms. This data provided a proxy for the degree of business 
model innovation. We conducted a Wilcoxon test between our construct for the degree of 
business model innovation and the score given by the independent study in The Banker 
(Piggot, 2001). The Wilcoxon test showed a significant pair-wise matching (p<.01), which 
provides confidence that our survey rating is a reliable proxy for the degree of business 
model innovation construct. The Wilcoxon test is a parametric test. However, in order to test 
for the robustness, we also did the comparison using the non-parametric Fisher-Pitman test, 
and the results were consistent with the Wilcoxon text whereby it revealed significant pair-
wise matching (p<0.01). Therefore, our measure of the degree of business model innovation 
is compatible with the independent measure as reported in The Banker magazine (Pigott, 
2001).  
In order to verify the inter-rater reliability, we conducted the Proportional Reduction 
in Loss (PRL) reliability measure analysis (Rust and Cooil, 1994) on our ratings of six 
experts. The proportion of inter-judge agreement corresponded to 85 per cent, which is above 
the acceptable level of agreement between judges on their ratings of the business model 
innovation (Nunnally, 1978). In addition, we conducted Wilcoxon tests between the ratings 
of different experts, where we found significant evidence for inter-rater score reliability 
(p<.05). Both these tests provide confidence that the expert raters are in agreement with one 
another in their ratings of the platforms. 
Third-party alliance partners: The second explanatory variable of interest is whether there 
was a third-party alliance formed to benefit from complementary assets. We examined the 
BMA reports and press releases to determine whether the trading platform formed an alliance 
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with any third-party firm in order to have synergies from complementary assets. For example, 
an alliance with Bloomberg (a major established firm that distributes information in the 
financial services industry) would enable the new platform firm to benefit from the large 
distribution network of Bloomberg. When an alliance was formed with a third-party firm in 
order to benefit from complementary assets we coded this variable as 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Control variables: We included several control variables in our research model to enable a 
more accurate test of our hypothesis. Prior research has shown that the performance of firms 
depends on factors such as ownership (Colombo and Delmastro, 2001), degree of competition 
in the market place (Schmidt, 1997), diversification strategy of the firm (Colombo and 
Delmastro, 2001), geographic location (Chung and Kalnis, 2001) and size (Klepper, 1996).   
The type of ownership matters because of the ability of the owners to redeploy 
resources and the commitment to recover sunk costs (Dunne et al., 1989). We control for 
ownership by including a construct to measure the presence of entrepreneurs as owner–
managers. The degree of competition can influence the survival of firms as a result of 
additional managerial effort to reduce failure (Schmidt, 1997). We control for competition by 
measuring the degree of product market competition across the different securities. The level 
of diversification strategy of the firm matters because of the ability of firms to cross-subsidize 
between different product lines (Colombo and Delmastro, 2001). We control for the level of 
diversification strategy using a measure that captures the breadth of the products that the 
firms provide to the market. The geographic location of the firm matters because firms 
locating in a similar geography could result in a spillover of knowledge and therefore 
agglomeration effects (Chung and Kalnis, 2001). We control for geographic effects using a 
measure that captures whether the firm is locating across more than one geography. Finally, 
size is important because arguably larger firms might have more resources to withstand lower 
performance than smaller firms (Klepper, 1996). Since we are unable to measure directly the 
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size of the firms in our sample as a result of unavailability of data, we provide a proxy 
measure to capture size. In particular, we control for whether an incumbent firm had an 
equity stake in the new firm. The new firm with the investment support of an incumbent firm 
is more likely to have more resources when compared to not having such backing, and hence 
this acts as a proxy for size. We next describe the operationalization of our control variables. 
Entrepreneurs as owner–managers: The press releases associated with the launch of the 
platforms provided information about whether existing employees of the banks, major 
financial and non-financial firms left their jobs to set up these platforms. We cross-checked in 
order to validate that these employees were owners and also held senior management 
positions within the new trading-platforms. We call these employees entrepreneurs as owner–
managers. We created a dummy variable to account for the presence of entrepreneurs as 
owner–managers in the new trading platform. If an entrepreneur were present as an owner–
manager in the platform, this dummy variable would be set to 1 and 0 otherwise.  
Competition: The traditional method of measuring competition in the literature is to use 
market-share concentration (see Aghion et al., 2005). However, since we are examining 
nascent industries with start-up firms, the market share concentration is not available. 
Therefore, we proxy the market-share concentration via an index. In particular, we developed 
an index to operationalize the product market competition faced by the platforms at the time 
of their launch. Although we were studying one industry we were able to analyze the 
competition by examining the degree of competition in the different product categories within 
the overall industry.  
The BMA reports defined 11 products or financial instruments (e.g., Treasury bonds, 
Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), among others) that each 
of these trading platforms used to enable trading between customers. The ratio of the number 
of platforms trading in a particular instrument category with respect to the overall number of 
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platforms existing at the time of launch of a platform provided a measure of the degree of 
competition in these markets. We call this ratio     
   
   
, where     is the number of 
platforms trading in instrument   at time  , and     is the overall number of platforms existing 
at time  . The measure of the degree of competition is calculated as the average value of the 
ratio for all the instruments that the platform traded in,     
∑    
 
   
 
 , where   is the 
platform’s name, and   is the number of instruments traded by that platform. For example, let 
us assume that platform A (launched in 1997) traded in two instruments (e.g., Treasury bonds 
and ABS). In addition, for illustrative purposes, we assume the ratio of the number of 
platforms trading in each of these instruments in 1997, where                     and 
              . Then the competition index for platform A is         
         
 
     . 
This construct operationalizes product market competition, whereby the higher the number of 
trading platforms already operating in a particular instrument category, the higher the product 
market competition in that market. The data on the number of platforms existing in each 
instrument category was obtained from the BMA reports. 
Breadth of the platform: We measure the breadth of the platform by the number of products 
offered by the platform. The BMA reports categorized the number of instruments traded by 
each platform into 11 general categories, as discussed earlier. The breadth measure is a count 
variable indicating the number of instruments that were enabled to trade on each of the 
platforms respectively.  
Geographic spread: We operationalized the geographic spread of the platform by examining 
whether the platform traded just in its own domestic market or in both its domestic and 
international markets. The bond platforms were domiciled either in Europe or the US. As a 
result of the international nature of bond markets, we classified domicile as either US or 
Europe. Therefore, when the platform traded in both its domestic market and an international 
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market (e.g., the US and Europe) the variable was given a value of 1. If the platform traded 
only in the domestic market (either the US or Europe) then the variable was coded as 0. We 
obtained the data for this variable from the BMA reports. 
Size: We operationalized the size of the firm by using a proxy as to whether the incumbent 
firm in the industry took an equity stake in the platform. When an incumbent investment bank 
had an equity stake in the platform the variable was given a value of 1 and 0 otherwise. The 
data for this variable was obtained from the BMA reports and press releases.  
In Table 4 we present the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the 
variables of interest. All the correlations are below 0.3 and do not pose any significant issues. 
Table 4 about here. 
4. Econometric Model and Regressions 
We are interested in estimating the probability of the new firms exiting when they reach a 
certain age. We do not have information on the length of survival for firms that continued to 
survive at the end of our period of analysis. Therefore, we have right censoring of our data. 
We use a proportional hazard model to assess survival of the firms. Conventional statistical 
methods such as Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for estimation are ruled out because of the 
violation of least squares assumptions and because they do not correct for the problem of 
right censoring. The following model describes a proportional hazard model, which can be 
formally represented by: 
 )exp()/( 0 iii xxth    for kt .....1 , 
where the left-hand-side variable is the hazard rate (i.e., the probability that the firm exits at 
time t  given that it survived until t-1). The parameters 0  identify the baseline hazard 
function, which provides the exit rates for a firm whose covariates denoted by the vector x  
assume a value of 0 and i  is the vector of regression coefficients. We use the exponential 
distribution, which assumes that the hazard rate for survival remains constant throughout the 
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period of study. We also test for robustness of our results with a Weibull distribution whereby 
the hazard rate monotonically increases or decreases, which is estimated from the data. We 
clustered the analysis by the cohorts of the launch times of the firms. 
Since we are using a proportional hazard model to assess the survival of the firm, we 
need an assessment to ensure that the proportional hazard assumption is met (Hosmer and 
Lemeshow 1999). The proportional hazard model assumes that the proportionate increase or 
decrease in risk associated with a set of characteristics relative to the baseline case is the 
same for all time durations, t. If the relationships between the independent variables and the 
dependent variable are also a function of time then the proportional hazard assumption is 
violated, making the model unsuitable for the study. Two generally accepted testing strategies 
are available for the proportional hazard assumption (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1999). The 
first test is to conduct a time-dependent proportional hazard regression with the independent 
variables and the natural logarithm of time. The second test is the examination of Schoenfeld 
residual plots. We conducted both tests for our study.  
In the first test we ran the proportional hazard model by including both main effects 
(degree of business model innovation and third-party alliance) and an interaction term 
between the construct to be tested and the natural logarithm of time. The Wald test, which 
tests the significance of the natural logarithm of time term, was found to be non-significant, 
providing evidence that the proportional hazard assumption was met for the degree of 
business model innovation and third-party alliance with respect to the dependent variable. In 
the second test we plotted the Schoenfeld residuals for both the variables of interest (degree 
of business model innovation and third-party alliance) against the natural logarithm of time. 
Visual inspection indicates that the residuals were fairly random and neither trended in a 
particular direction nor showed any form of clustering, which provides evidence that the 
proportional hazard assumption was met. 
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 In order to test for the robustness of our analysis we need to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity consists of factors not explicitly included in the 
model, which are correlated with those included in the model that might bias the estimated 
effects. While we cannot observe all firm-specific heterogeneity, we could model it assuming 
the presence of firm-specific random-effects, which are assumed to be distributed according 
to an inverse Gaussian distribution for computational convenience (Han and Hausman, 1990; 
Hougaard, 1984; Manton, Stallard and Vaupel, 1986), which we discuss later. We discuss the 
results in the next section. 
 
5. Results 
Hypothesis 1 states that the survival time of new firms has a curvilinear (taking an inverted 
U-shape) relationship to the degree of business model innovation, wherein new firms with a 
high or low degree of business model innovation are more likely to survive for longer than 
new firms with a moderate degree of business model innovation. Table 5 examines the 
association between survival of the new firms and the degree of business model innovation. 
We include both a measure of degree of business model innovation and degree of innovation 
squared. Model 1 includes the main explanatory variable and the control variables. Model 2 
includes the interaction term for the degree of business model innovation and the third-party 
alliance formed. Models 3 and 4 include the inverse Gaussian distribution to capture any 
unobserved heterogeneity for Models 1 and 2 respectively.  
When the coefficient of the hazard model is larger than 1, it implies that, as the covariate 
increases, so does the hazard rate (i.e., the time of exit of the firms is advanced). On the other 
hand, when the coefficient of the hazard model is less than 1, as the covariate increases, the 
hazard rate decreases (i.e., the time of exit of the firms is delayed).  
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The coefficient for the direct relationship between the degree of business model 
innovation and the hazard rate is significant and larger than 1, showing that the degree of 
business model innovation is an important factor in explaining the survival of the firms. 
However, the significant coefficient of less than 1 for the degree of business model 
innovation squared in all models implies that as the degree of business model innovation 
increases, the time of exit by firms is advanced initially and then delayed. In other words, the 
survival time for firms is higher when the degree of business model innovation is low or high, 
but when the degree of business model innovation is moderate the survival time is the 
shortest. This result provides support for Hypothesis 1. Our model is robust to a different 
distribution. In order to check for robustness we also ran the model with a Weibull 
distribution and we obtained similar results to those of Model 1. Among the control variables 
we find entrepreneur as owner–manager, breadth of products and geographical coverage to be 
consistently significant. 
Table 5 about here. 
Hypothesis 2 states that the relationship between a new firm’s degree of business model 
innovation and survival is negatively moderated by partnering with third-party firms with 
complementary assets. In order to test Hypothesis 2, we ran the model with the interaction 
term between the degree of business model innovation and third-party alliance variable. This 
is shown in Model 2 of Table 5. The coefficient for the direct relationship between the third-
party alliance and the hazard rate is significant and smaller than 1, showing that the third-
party alliance is an important factor in enhancing the survival of the firms. The significant 
coefficient of more than 1 for the interaction between the degree of business model 
innovation and third-party alliance implies that third-party alliance reduces the effect of 
survival of the new firms as the degree of business model innovation increases. This result 
provides support for Hypothesis 2.  
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In order to understand better how the moderated effect (third-party alliance) reflects the 
hypothesized relationship, we conduct effect size interpretation of the interaction term (Carr, 
Boyar and Gregory, 2008; Trevor, 2001). Using the unstandardized coefficient of the model 
with the moderated term, the total effect on the hazard rate multiplier and the change in 
survival likelihood of the firms for high and low levels (the presence or absence) of third-
party alliance on the degree of business model innovation were calculated to test Hypothesis 
2. The first step in interpreting the impact on firm survival likelihood is to examine the 
moderating variable: third-party alliance at low and high values (for instance, +1 and -1 to 
account for a one standard deviation increase or decrease in the variable of interest). The 
hazard ratios for the degree of business model innovation and the interaction term of degree 
of business model innovation and third-party alliance are 1.97 and 1.58 respectively based on 
Model 4 (Model 4 includes a Gaussian distribution to account for unobserved heterogeneity 
which we discuss later). This gives corresponding non-exponentiated values of 0.68 and 0.48 
respectively. Consequently, a one standard-deviation increase in the degree of business model 
innovation results in a 3.1 multiplier of the hazard rate (that is, exp[0.68+0.48]), and 
subsequently a 211 per cent decrease in survival rate for the new firm at any time t, when 
third-party alliance is high (presence). The same increase in the degree of business model 
innovation translates to a 1.2 multiplier and a 24.7 decrease in survival rate for the new firms 
at any time t, when third-party alliance is low (absence). Thus, when third-party alliance is 
high, the effect of the degree of business model innovation on the survival rate of new firms 
decreases by almost 10 times compared to when third-party alliance is low, providing support 
for Hypothesis 2. 
Our model is robust to a different distribution. In order to check for robustness we also 
ran the model with a Weibull distribution and obtained similar results to those of Model 2. 
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Among the control variables we find entrepreneur as owner–manager, breadth of products, 
geographical coverage and size to be consistently significant. 
In addition, we ran the model to account for unobserved heterogeneity by using the 
inverse Gaussian distribution. The theta that captures the unobserved heterogeneity is not 
significant, which implies that unobserved heterogeneity is not an issue for our model, as 
shown in Models 3 and 4 respectively. The results of Model 3 are consistent with those of 
Model 1. Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported. The results of Model 4 are consistent with those 
of Model 2. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is supported. 
One possible issue for the phenomenon we are addressing is that firms partnering other 
third-party firms for complementary assets are tailoring their degree of business model 
innovation accordingly. However, we eliminate such possibilities because correlation 
between third-party alliance and the degree of business model innovation is negative and not 
significant, as shown in Table 4. 
Impact of profits: In order to further illuminate the results of our study, we examine the 
relationship between the degree of business model innovation and profit. Since our sample 
consists of new firms, the performance in terms of profits or market share is not reported 
publicly and hence not available. Therefore, we proxy the performance of these new firms by 
constructing two variables. The first examines the number of times from the initial launch 
that the firm diversified and launched a separate product (financial instrument in this case) 
that was different from the initial product (obtained from BMI reports and press releases). 
Arguably, the more times a firm launches new products in the initial years that are distinct 
from its stated strategy, the less successful it will be in capturing sufficient market share from 
its initial product category. The second proxy for performance examines the number of times 
the new firm raised external finance following its launch as a result of a shortage of cash 
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(obtained from BMI reports and press releases). Arguably, the more times a firm raises 
external funding, the less successful it is in generating cash internally from the operations of 
its existing business. We analyzed the degree of business model innovation against these two 
measures of performance and report the results in Table 6 (which reports the average for 
these two proxy profit measures for different degrees of business model innovation). The 
analysis in Table 6 shows that performance is best when the degree of business model 
innovation is low (scales 1–2) and when it is high (scales 4–5), and worst when the degree of 
business model innovation is moderate (scale 3). This result is consistent for both proxy 
measures of profit, as shown in Table 6. We conducted a paired t-test, which shows that the 
proxy performance measures are different across the degree of business model innovation 
(p<.01). Therefore, the performance of the business model appears to follow the same pattern 
as the survival of the firms, whereby high performance is associated with an increased 
survival rate, and this is so when the degree of business model innovation is either low or 
high. 
Table 6 about here. 
Interviews with firms: In order to further explore our results we conducted interviews with 35 
managers from the electronic trading platform firms. Our interviews reveal support for our 
empirical findings. A senior executive in one of the firms articulated the importance of the 
degree of business model innovation on survival:  
Often the best approach to create superior performance in the electronic bond trading 
market is either to innovate the business model incrementally so users can get used to the 
change slowly or alternatively to go for a radical business model innovation as this 
enables the game to be changed dramatically which leaves competitors behind.  
Another executive went on to articulate the importance of third-party alliance:  
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We find that often partnering other firms helps. However, the partnering approach is most 
effective when the business model is not altered radically as it creates significant 
complexity and coordination costs. 
6. Discussion and Implications 
In summary, we find a highly significant U-shaped relationship between the degree of 
business model innovation and the survival time of the new firms. Moreover, we show that 
partnering with third-party firms with complementary assets reduces the survival of new 
firms as the degree of business model innovation increases.  
 We believe that our study makes several important contributions. First, we establish 
the contingent role of the degree of business model innovation on firm survival. Second, we 
explore the fit between a focal firm’s degree of business model innovation and third-party 
alliance for complementary assets on survival. In doing so, we explore the notion that the 
business model construct transcends the boundary of the firm to effect transactions. These 
two contributions highlight the degree of business model innovation as a source of 
competitive advantage and provide an initial step towards understanding better the associated 
contingent structural factors that might influence firm performance.  
 Our study shows that the profit (as per the proxy measures) of the business model 
appears to follow the same pattern as the survival of the firms, whereby high performance is 
associated with either a low or high degree of business model innovation, while low 
performance is associated with a moderate degree of business model innovation. The industry 
we examine displays strong demand-side externalities, whereby trades would migrate to 
platforms that have the most market share (or liquidity). This is because buyers/sellers want 
to trade where other buyers/sellers are trading as it provides them with more information 
about price levels. Increasingly many Internet-related industries display such network effects 
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and, hence, we believe that the pattern we observe between the degree of business model 
innovation and survival might hold in such markets. Our results need to be empirically tested 
in industries that do not display strong network effects in order to examine how and when 
they might be relevant. 
 The distinction between incremental and radical innovation has been made in the 
literature based on the degree of newness relative to an existing proposition. The degree of 
newness can be seen from an internal, as well as external, perspective (Garcia and Calantone, 
2002). An internal perspective concerns the firm in terms of technology and other resources 
and routines. An external perspective concerns the customers and market. In connecting the 
internal and external perspectives, a number of scholars have made a distinction between 
innovation that challenges the technical capabilities of the firm and innovation that challenges 
the firm’s knowledge of the market and customer needs (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; 
Henderson and Clark, 1990). This is a helpful distinction that explains why even a seemingly 
minor improvement in technological products often results in incumbent firms being unable 
to respond, which in turn affects their performance adversely. The explanation draws on the 
notion that distinguishes between the components of the product and the way (Henderson and 
Clark, 1990) in which they are integrated into the system that is the product architecture. 
Hence, established firms find it difficult to respond to innovations that change the 
architecture of the product without changing the components. This is because such 
architectural knowledge becomes embedded in existing structures and procedures, making it 
hard to recognize and correct. However, the extant literature examines the issue from a 
product or process innovation perspective.  
Business models can be seen as the organizational design that connects the internal 
perspective of the firm to the external perspective and therefore captures how the firm goes to 
market to implement the strategy. Hence, the degree of business model innovation captures 
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the newness in the method of doing business that connects the factor market with the 
customer market. Therefore, business model innovation is more systemic in nature compared 
to product or process innovation as it concerns the alignment of the customer value 
proposition with how value is created and captured (Velu and Stiles, 2013). Therefore, it is 
possible that an incremental product or process innovation results in a radical business model 
innovation in order to deliver the proposition to market. Moreover, scholars have argued that 
business model innovation does not necessarily need a new technology; however, new 
technologies can often act as a catalyst for business model innovation (Baden-Fuller and 
Haefliger, 2013). In addition, business models typically span an even wider range of firm 
functions and external partners to access complementary assets than do traditional product or 
process innovations. Therefore, the coordination challenges and the outcome resulting from 
change for business model innovation are often less predictable than product or process 
innovations because of complex feedback loops.  
Our findings have several implications for managers, theory and policy-makers. For 
managers, it appears that the degree of business model innovation is crucial for survival of 
the venture. Our results suggest that new firms should either follow a cautious approach in 
trying to innovate their business model or be very radical in their business model innovation 
in order to ensure long-term survival. A moderate level of business model innovation is the 
least favourable in terms of ensuring the survival of the new firm. The first approach of 
incremental business model innovation ensures that the firm is able to gradually learn about 
the changes in the value proposition, value creation and capture in designing a business 
model that ensures better performance in terms of survival times. On the other hand, a radical 
business model innovation ensures that the value proposition is changed drastically, and 
being a pioneer ensures better performance in terms of survival times. A moderate change, 
however, has similarities to the ‘stuck-in-the-middle’ hypothesis of Porter regarding 
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corporate strategy, and hence results in a poorer performance in terms of survival times. The 
findings suggest that managers need to adopt either an incremental or a radical business 
model innovation to accommodate any degree of product or process innovation rather than 
adopting a moderate business model innovation in order to ensure superior performance and 
ultimately survival. Our second finding suggests that managers should try to avoid over-
partnering to leverage complementary assets in the case of radical business model innovation. 
This is particularly so when the business model innovation accommodates a product or 
process innovation that might call for partnering. Managers need to understand the potential 
differential effects of partnering for product and process innovations compared to business 
model innovation. 
This study has implications for theory. Our results have implications for further 
understanding the relationship between product and process innovation and the role of 
technology management in influencing the degree of business model innovation. Unpacking 
this relationship further from a theoretical perspective is required in order to understand the 
implications on firm performance. On a related matter, our study has implications for further 
developing the theory on how partnering to access complementary assets for product and 
process innovations interfaces with business model innovation.  
 For policy-makers interested in promoting new firm development and innovation in 
the financial services industry, it is important to provide support for radical business model 
innovation as well as learning opportunities in order for new firms to test the water using 
incremental business model innovations. Moreover, policy-makers need to encourage and 
provide support for alliance formation, especially in the case of firms with incrementally new 
business models. Arguably, policy-makers would need to take this into account in the 
financial services industry with the many regulatory changes following the 2008 credit crisis. 
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7. Conclusions 
In this study, we address the question of how the degree of business model innovation affects 
the survival of new firms. We assembled a new data set of 129 electronic trading platforms in 
the US bond markets between 1995 and 2004. We find a robust relationship showing that 
new firms adopting both incremental and radical business model innovations are more likely 
to survive longer than those adopting moderate business model innovations. We also show 
that partnering with third-party firms with complementary assets reduces the survival of new 
firms as the degree of business model innovation increases. 
There are certain limitations to our study. First, we have restricted our covariates to be 
non-time varying, which could affect the effect of business model innovation on the survival 
of new firms. Second, we do not study how the business models of the new firms evolve over 
time and how this affects survival. We leave these issues to be examined in future studies, but 
we hope that the current study provides a starting-point for further investigation into how the 
degree of business model innovation affects the survival of new firms. 
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank Arun Jacob and Shareen Kaur for help with the 
data collection and analysis. The author thanks Sriya Iyer for comments on earlier versions of 
this article.  
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Table 1: Difference between incremental and radical business model innovations 
Business Model 
Components 
MarketAxess – An 
Example of an Incremental 
Business Model Innovation 
BondBook – An Example of 
a Radical Business Model 
Innovation 
Value proposition and value 
creation 
Marginal changes to the 
product (from telephone to e-
trading platform). 
 
 
Marginal changes to the 
distribution (buyers and 
sellers still trade through a 
dealer bank acting as an 
intermediary, except that it 
occurs over the electronic 
platform rather than via 
telephone). 
 
Marginal changes to the 
promotion (which remains 
active and dealer-led, but 
occurs over the electronic 
platform rather than via 
telephone). 
Significant changes to the 
product (from telephone to e-
trading directly between 
investors).  
 
Significant changes to the 
distribution (from dealers 
acting as intermediary to 
direct trading between buyers 
and sellers, which enables a 
more transparent, 
comprehensive and unfiltered 
view of the market place). 
 
Significant changes to 
promotion (from being 
actively dealer-led to being 
passively buyer-initiated 
information-gathering on the 
e-platform). 
Value capture Enabled via the difference 
between buy and sell prices 
for the securities (bonds). 
Enabled via transaction fees 
or credit guarantee fees for 
each transaction. 
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Table 2: Summary of the measures and the relevant data sources 
 
Conceptual Variable 
 
Measure 
 
Data Source 
Business model innovation The degree of business 
model innovation 
Survey among experts 
Third-party alliance Whether there was an 
alliance with a third party 
BMA reports 
Entrepreneurs as O–M Entrepreneurs involved as 
owner–managers 
Press release 
Competition Average relative number 
of firms in each segment 
BMA reports 
Breadth Number of instruments 
traded 
BMA reports 
Geographic spread Dummy indicating US & 
Europe presence 
BMA reports, press release 
Size Whether incumbent bank 
had an equity stake 
BMA reports, press release 
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Table 3: Extract of survey on business model innovation 
Traditional Business Model 
The traditional business model for trading bonds involves transactions carried out via the 
telephone. Customers typically call multiple broker–dealers to get a quote for a buy or sell 
order. Broker–dealers in turn quote prices for the buy or sell orders. Broker–dealers typically 
make a market by holding securities in inventory in order to match the supply and demand of 
the bonds over time. In doing so, broker–dealers could act as a principal for the transaction as 
they are sometimes able to deliver the bonds from their own inventory. Broker–dealers earn 
their revenue from the difference between the buy and sell prices. 
 
New Business Model 
LogicTrade is a real-time Internet-based service for trading high-yield and distressed 
corporate debt, convertible bonds, emerging-markets bonds and municipal securities with full 
anonymity and price transparency in a highly secure system. Users are able to see buy and 
sell orders, entered by broker–dealers and institutional investors, as they are entered into the 
system, as well as price and quantity information for all trades as they occur. The system 
automatically matches orders on a strict price/time priority basis. In addition, LogicTrade 
provides free, real-time detailed financial news regarding the issuers whose securities are 
available for trading. LogicTrade market participants are able to receive quotes on and 
purchase municipal bond insurance from the Municipal Bond Insurance Association (MBIA 
Inc.). LogicTrade does not trade for its own account, acts as riskless principal in all 
transactions and discloses the mark-ups and mark-downs for each transaction. LogicTrade in 
turn earns a fee for each transaction as its source of revenue. 
Note: The name of the new business model, LogicTrade, has been changed to preserve 
anonymity. 
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Failure 0.64 0.48 1.00        
2 BM 
innovation 
2.65 0.69 -0.11 1.00       
3 Third-party 
alliance 
0.22 0.42 -0.15 -0.09 1.00      
4 Entrepreneur
-ship 
0.27 0.44 0.28* 0.09 -0.20* 1.00     
5 Competition 17.58 10.84 -0.19* -0.04 0.01 0.01 1.00    
6 Breadth  2.13 1.51 0.24* 0.10 0.03 0.08 -0.05 1.00   
7 Geographic 
spread 
0.21 0.41 -0.17 0.00 0.15 -0.15 -0.09 0.15 1.00  
8 Size 0.29 0.45 0.07 0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 -0.02 0.14 1.00 
(N=129) *p<0.05 
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Table 5: Models for duration of new firm survival 
 Dependent Variable: Survival Time 
Independent 
Variables  
 Hazard Model (with exponential 
distribution) 
Model M1 M2 M3 M4 
 
Business model 
innovation 
3.64*** 
(0.89) 
2.74*** 
(0.95) 
3.46*** 
(0.81) 
1.97** 
(0.66) 
Business model 
innovation squared 
0.72*** 
(0.01) 
0.75*** 
(0.03) 
0.71*** 
(0.02) 
0.77*** 
(0.04) 
Third-party 
alliance 
0.60*** 
(0.05) 
0.32*** 
(0.01) 
0.49** 
(0.16) 
0.15*** 
(0.07) 
Entrepreneurship 3.07*** 
(0.15) 
3.04*** 
(0.17) 
3.75*** 
(1.10) 
3.94*** 
(1.36) 
Competition 0.98 
(0.01) 
0.98 
(0.14) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
0.98 
(0.02) 
Breadth  1.19*** 
(0.03) 
1.19** 
(0.03) 
1.26*** 
(0.02) 
1.27*** 
(0.02) 
Geographic spread 0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.36*** 
(0.03) 
0.29*** 
(0.05) 
0.27*** 
(0.06) 
Size 1.68 
(0.42) 
1.72** 
(0.41) 
1.88 
(1.02) 
2.05 
(1.22) 
Business Model 
Innovation*Third-
party alliance 
 1.29***  1.58*** 
(0.04) 
Variance of 
heterogeneity 
distribution 
  0.20 0.27 
Log 
pseudolikelihood 
-61.07*** -60.93*** -60.70*** -60.38*** 
N = 129     
***: p<.01,   **: p<.05,    *p<0.10  
Note:   
(1) Standard errors given inside parentheses. 
(2) The significance of the Log pseudolikelihood at the 1 per cent level shows that at least 
one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to 0 (Green and Hensher 2010, pp. 
153–4). 
(3) The heterogeneity distribution is an Inverse Gaussian distribution. 
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Table 6: Degree of business model innovation and performance 
 Degree of Business Model Innovation 
 Low (Scales 1–2) Moderate (Scale 3) High (Scale 4–5) 
The average number 
of times from initial 
launch that the firm 
has diversified and 
launched a separate 
product 
1.51 2.02 1.31 
The average number 
of times the new firm 
raised external 
finance following its 
launch as result of a 
shortage of cash 
1.28 1.82 1.38 
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